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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an Appeal from an Order of the Third Circuit Court granting Defendant
David P. Adams', Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing with Prejudice Plaintiff,
Vernon J. Thomas' claim. The Order was signed by the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings
on January 22, 1990. The Court of Appeals for the State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear
and decide this appeal pursuant to the Utah Constitution, Art. VII, § 1 and § 5; Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(c) (1953), as amended; and Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule
4(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the original Complaint filed by Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, against
Defendant David P. Adams constitutes an insurance subrogation claim pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-2M08 and § 31A-22-309. The standard for review is that in deciding
whether the trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing
party, the Court of Appeals should give no deference to the trial court's view of the law;
but must review it for correctness. Utah State Coal of Sr. Citizens v. UP&L. 776 P.2d 632,
634 (Utah 1989).
2.

Whether Summary Judgment was appropriately granted pursuant to Judge

Hutchings finding that the Complaint was an attempt at a subrogation claim and therefore
the wrong parties were listed in the Complaint and the parties were required to engage in
arbitration prior to suit. The standard for review is the same as in the first issue stated.
Where no material facts remain unresolved, the Court must examine the trial court's
conclusions of law and review them for correctness. English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156
(Utah App. 1989).
1

STATUTES
Interpretation of the following two statutes is determinative of the aforementioned
issues in this case:
1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 (1986). Subrogation Actions. Subrogation
actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured.
2. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1986). Every policy providing personal
injury protection coverage is subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person
to whom benefits required under personal injury protection
then paid by another insured, including the Worker's
Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person who
would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer
for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its
amount shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration
between the insurers.

STATEMENT OF CASE AND DISPOSITION
On October 9, 1989, the Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, filed a Complaint against the
Defendant, David P. Adams, alleging that the Defendant negligently and carelessly caused
his motor vehicle to collide with the vehicle owned by the Plaintiff. Plaintiffs Complaint
states that as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence and carelessness,
Plaintiff suffered a heart attack. Plaintiff prayed for judgment against the Defendant in the
sum of $3,000.00. See Complaint, p. 1 and p. 2, Exhibit A. In Mr. Thomas' Appellate
Brief, it is stated that his insurer, Allstate Insurance Co. brought a subrogation suit against
Defendant's insurer. This is not the case. Nowhere in the Complaint is Allstate Insurance
referenced nor is Defendant's insurer. Also, there is no indication in the Complaint that
2

the suit was to be a subrogation suit for PIP reimbursement. It is merely presented as a
negligence action between individual parties.
On November 10, 1989, the Defendant, Mr. Adams, answered Plaintiffs Complaint
setting forth as a Fourth Defense that Plaintiff had executed a release of all claims dated
August 9, 1989, and that, therefore, Plaintiffs claim was barred. See Answer, p. 1 and p.
2, and Release of All Claims, Exhibits B and C.
On November 17, 1989, the Defendant, David P. Adams, filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, responded by filing a Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on November 27,1989. It was
in this Memorandum that Plaintiff, for the first time, indicated that the Complaint was,
although not alleged, really a subrogation case for PIP reimbursement pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1953), as amended. See Plaintiffs Memorandum at p. 2, Exhibit
D.
On January 22, 1990, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings granted Mr. Adams'
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. His reasons for
dismissing the case were that: (1) This is a subrogation claim and should be decided by
arbitration, and (2) the proper parties are insurance companies. See Order, p. 1, Exhibit
E. The Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, has appealed this decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the facts recited in Appellant's Brief, the following additional facts
are pertinent to the issues before the Court and will clarify what is misleading in
Appellant's Statement of Facts. It is true that on December 14, 1987, the Plaintiff, Vernon
J. Thomas, and the Defendant, David P. Adams, were involved in a motor vehicle accident
3

in Salt Lake City. Mr. Adams did in fact reimburse Mr. Thomas for damage to his vehicle.
It is also a fact that Plaintiff suffered a heart attack some time after the accident. However,
it is not a fact that Plaintiffs heart attack was a direct and proximate result of the accident,
and, there is no evidence to prove this.
At the time of the accident Plaintiff was insured by Allstate Insurance Company
and Defendant was insured by Vanliner Insurance Company. See Release of All Claims,
Exhibit C. On January 12, 1988, Allstate Insurance Company sent an inter-insurer
subrogation memorandum to Frontier Adjusters (representing Vanliner Insurance Company)
requesting payment for repairs to Mr. Thomas' vehicle in the amount of $1609.00. This was
paid by Frontier Adjusters.

See Inter-Insurer Memo, Exhibit F.

The subrogation

memorandum also indicated that medical expenses were pending for Vernon Thomas and
Huetta Thomas. Mr. Thomas' medical expenses were related to a heart attack which he
suffered as a result of coronary artery disease.
On August 9, 1989, Vernon Thomas represented by Phillip C. Story, Jr. signed a
release discharging Mr. Adams, A&M Moving & Storage, Inc., and Transprotection
Insurance Company and Vanliner Insurance Company from any liability related to the
accident, in consideration of the payment to Mr. Thomas of $5,000.00.
On April 4, 1988, Peter Stirba representing Vanliner Insurance Company and A&M
Moving & Storage sent a letter to Allstate regarding its Subrogation Memorandum and
stating that "Allstate's claim for medical expenses relating to Mr. Thomas' heart attack did
not arise out of the accident and therefore the claim submitted to Frontier Adjusters was
denied." See letter, Exhibit G. There was no mention of arbitration nor was arbitration
refused by Mr. Adams' insurer.
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On April 12, 1988, Allstate sent a letter to Mr. Stirba stating that it was one doctor's
opinion that the accident precipitated Mr. Thomas' heart attack by aggravating his
preexisting coronary artery disease. See letter, Exhibit H. Allstate also stated that it had
covered Mr. Thomas' medical expenses because of this doctor's opinion. Again, there was
no request for arbitration nor was a subrogation suit discussed in this letter. Appellant's
characterization of this letter is incorrect. Even the copy Appellant has attached to his
Brief does not state that Allstate was "expressly indicating its intent to file suit should the
insurer prove not to be a member of the inter-company arbitration." See Appellant's Brief,
p. 4 and attached letter. This letter did not call for a response and, therefore, none was
made.
On October 9, 1989, the Complaint was filed by Mr. Thomas against Mr. Adams
in Circuit Court, State of Utah, for negligence in the amount of $3,000.00 for medical
expenses suffered by Mr. Thomas relating to his heart attack.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The original Complaint filed in this matter, as pled, was a negligence action by
the Plaintiff, Vernon J. Thomas, against the Defendant, David P. Adams, and nothing
more. There is no mention in that Complaint of subrogation or insurance companies.
The Complaint, as it was pled was a simple negligence action between individual parties
and since both parties had already signed a release of all claims relating to the accident,
the Complaint was barred.
2. If the intent of Plaintiff was to bring a subrogation claim, the Circuit Court below
was correct in granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for the following
two reasons. First, the Complaint, as a subrogation action, named the wrong parties and
5

was not pled in the names of the proper parties, the insurance companies. Secondly,
binding arbitration is statutorily required to determine the issue of liability for
reimbursement of PIP benefits often paid by one insurance company which it is claimed is
owed by another. Allstate has not attempted to pursue arbitration.
INTRODUCTION
The standard for appellate review requires that this Court look only to facts which
were in the record below. Plaintiff/Appellant has argued several facts for the first time on
appeal and Defendant/Appellee would like to address the Court's attention to the
impropriety of this. The record below consists of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant's answer,
Defendant's Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Memorandum
in Opposition and Defendant's Reply Memorandum. The Release of all Claims was also
made a part of the record.
The Plaintiff, Mr. Thomas now seeks to introduce new facts and evidence to this
Court for review. Mr. Thomas has included an Inter-Insurer Subrogation Memorandum,
a letter to Allstate from Peter Stirba and a letter to Mr. Stirba from Allstate (although not
signed by Allstate) with his Brief. Mr. Adams submits that this is improper and that these
items should be disregarded by the Court on review.
ARGUMENTS
A, The Original Complaint as Pled Was a Negligence Claim Between Individuals
Although Allstate Insurance Company seems to be the party appealing the lower
court ruling the fact is that the original Plaintiff was Vernon J. Thomas. There is not one
single allegation in the Complaint referencing that the action below was a subrogation
6

action. There was not one single allegation in the Complaint indicating that, although the
suit was brought in the name of Vernon Thomas, it was really Allstate Insurance Company
who was suing as a subrogation claim. Furthermore, the matter was brought against the
Defendant David P. Adams, the driver who was involved in the accident, rather than against
his insurance carrier. There is no question that if the case was in fact a subrogation action
for the reimbursement of PIP benefits under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6) (1953), as
amended, the proper party to the lawsuit would have been Defendant's insurance carrier
not Defendant individually.
The Plaintiff, Mr. Thomas, continues to reference the following statute which states:
"Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured. Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-21-108 (1986) The Defendant agrees that this statute is relevant generally to
subrogation actions.

However, this is a very specific subrogation action for the

reimbursement of very specific benefits, i.e. PIP benefits. The controlling statute is Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (1953), as amended. The original pleading by Plaintiff in this
action was faulty for two reasons. First, there was no mention made that the claim against
the Defendant was subrogation action. Second, under the PIP reimbursement statute, "the
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for
payment...," Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)(a) (1953), as amended. The statute which
applies to this action is the specific subrogation statute relating to reimbursement for PIP
benefits. It does not allow Allstate to bring an action against an insurer in the name of its
insured, nor does it allow Allstate to sue an individual for reimbursement rather than the
insurer.
It is clear that the original claim was not intended to be a subrogation action. After
Allstate became aware that its insured had already signed a release with the Defendant, the
7

intent of Allstate to bring a subrogation action arose. This is why the release which was
signed by the original parties is so important to this matter. The release was signed by
Vernon J. Thomas with representation by his attorney and by David P. Adams, the
Defendant, in consideration of $5,000.00. This amount was paid to Mr. Thomas for the
release of the claim. Therefore, there can be no claim of negligence by Vernon J. Thomas
against David P. Adams and therefore, the release is dispositive of the original Complaint.
It was one month after the original Complaint had been filed when Allstate became aware
of the release and that the Complaint, as pled, would be barred by the release. It was only
then that Allstate began insisting that the original Complaint was a subrogation action
between the insurance carriers.
Thus, based upon the existing allegations in the Plaintiffs Complaint, the release
signed by the Plaintiff is dispositive of the case. The case as pled was not a subrogation
case and there was absolutely no reference in the Complaint to suggest that it was. Merely
because Allstate began calling the Complaint a subrogation claim, does not make it so.
B. If The Complaint Is To Be Construed As a Subrogation Claim. The Circuit Court Was
Correct In Granting Summary Judgment
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs Complaint should be construed differently than
what has been alleged, that the Complaint is a subrogation claim for PIP reimbursement,
then the Circuit Court was correct in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
based on the grounds that the Complaint named the wrong parties and, under the statute,
the Plaintiff did not attempt to arbitrate the claim prior to suit. The express language of
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6), (1988). requires that the claim be dismissed. Section
31A-22-309(6) states in pertinent part as follows:
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(6)
Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject
to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injury sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under person injury protection have been paid by another insurer,
including the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person
who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
(Emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiffs Complaint was deficient and flawed in two major
ways as was pointed out by Judge Hutchings and the Court below.
First, Plaintiff has failed to name the proper parties. In a subrogation action for
PIP reimbursement, according to the statute, the insurer or the person liable shall
reimburse the other insurer.

Thus, even if there is a subrogation claim, it is between

insurers and the proper party Plaintiff is Allstate and the proper party Defendant is Mr.
Adams' insurer. The statute, which Plaintiff continues to cite as determinative of this issue,
does not give the insurer in a PIP reimbursement claim the right to sue in the name of its
insurer. The statute, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 (1986) does not apply to this type of
subrogation claim. If it did, there would be no reason for the express language of the PIP
statute. Therefore, as the Circuit Court properly found, the claim has been brought in the
name of incorrect parties and, therefore, Judge Hutchings decision dismissing the action
with prejudice is correct.
Mr. Thomas cites several cases for the proposition that "these provisions both
embodied in the Insurance Code, must be construed harmoniously absent repeal or
amendment of either." The first case, Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983),
had nothing to do with the Insurance Code. The case does, however, cite a general rule
of statutory construction that, "if there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new
9

provision and the prior statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new provision will
control as it is the later expression of the legislature." Id., at 1318. Accordingly, the newer
and more specific statute would be the one to control here, as it reflects the expression of
the legislature with regard to subrogation actions for PIP reimbursement. Stahl v. Utah
Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980), also has nothing to do with the Insurance
Code and provides no assistance in interpreting these statutes.
Second, the subrogation action or liability that is being asserted for PIP
reimbursement, according to the No Fault PIP reimbursement statute, must be decided by
"mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)(b)
(1988). That being the case, the Circuit Court below was entirely correct in dismissing the
action because there has been no binding arbitration between the insurers. Allstate has
never initiated arbitration proceedings. Plaintiff has had opportunities to correct the errors
in its Complaint and also to request arbitration, but has done neither.
In Appellant's Brief, Mr. Thomas makes the following allegations; "arbitration has
become impossible," "Defendant's insurer refused to participate in the required arbitration,"
"Frontier Adjusters refused to respond to Allstate's arbitration inquiries," and "Allstate's
failure to initiate arbitration proceedings was justified where such action clearly would be
futile." All of these statements made in Appellant's Brief are false, not to mention the fact
that these issues were first raised on appeal. Mr. Adams objects to the issues above being
reviewed by this Court and suggests that they are irrelevant for the following reasons.
At no time was Vanliner Insurance Company or Frontier Adjusters ever asked to
participate in a binding arbitration with Allstate. Frontier Adjusters, by letter of counsel
on April 4, 1988, did refuse to pay a demand by Allstate for medical expenses incurred by
Mr. Thomas as a result of his heart attack. The reason for this was that Frontier Adjusters
10

did not consider those expenses to be related to the automobile accident. There was no
mention of arbitration and no refusal by Frontier Adjusters to arbitrate. Mr. Thomas
suggests that a letter from Allstate dated April 12, 1988 stated that "If the carrier you
represent is not a member of Inter Company Arbitration, we would have no option but to
file suit to recover our costs." The letter attached to Mr. Thomas' brief does not say this,
nor did the letter sent to Mr. Stirba. Frontier Adjusters did not respond to this letter as
there was no response called for and, furthermore, the language of that letter was in no way
an invitation to arbitrate the matter.
Even after Judge Hutchings found that the claim had been brought in the name of
improper parties and that a binding arbitration was required if this was in fact a subrogation
claim, Plaintiff chose to appeal the matter to this Court rather than ask for arbitration. The
statute itself states that arbitration is mandatory and therefore, Frontier Adjusters would
not be able to refuse as Plaintiff insists they have. Plaintiff admits on page 8 of Appellant's
Brief that it has "failed to initiate arbitration proceedings." Plaintiff goes on to state that
its failure to initiate arbitration proceedings is justified because the action would "clearly
be futile." If Plaintiff has never initiated any arbitration proceedings, how could Plaintiff
possibly know that such arbitration would be futile.
Mr. Thomas has improperly pled his claim.

Judge Hutchings was correct in

dismissing the claim as pled. The basis of Mr. Thomas' action is not within the review of
this Court. Plaintiff has violated both statutes cited above by bringing the action in the
names of improper parties and by failing to initiate mandatory arbitration proceedings with
the insurer. Consequently, Judge Hutchings of the Third Circuit Court was entirely correct
in dismissing the claim with prejudice and indicating that arbitration should be sought as
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a remedy. Mr. Thomas, however, chose to appeal that decision rather than initiating
arbitration with Mr. Adams' insurer.
CONCLUSION
One of the basic principles of appellate procedure is that an appellate court should
review questions of law and may not substitute its own view of the facts or make new fact
findings. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "a grant of Summary Judgment is
appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P., 56(c); Utah State Coal of
Senior Citizens v. UP&L. 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989). This Court, in the above case,
went on to note that in deciding whether the trial court properly granted judgment as a
matter of law to the prevailing party, "We give no difference to the trial court's view of the
law; we review it for correctness." Id, citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving. Inc. v.
Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1384-1385 (Utah 1989).
Here, the Circuit Court below granted summary judgment as a matter of law to Mr.
Adams.

It is the standard of the Court of Appeals to review that judgment for its

correctness as to the law. The Appellant has attempted to mislead the Court by asserting
facts which are not in the record below and not within the purview of the Court of Appeals.
For example, in Appellant's Brief, Appellant states that "Frontier Adjusters is neither based
nor licensed to do business in Utah." See Appellant's Brief, p. 7. This fact is entirely
incorrect and not present in the record anywhere below. Another example of Appellant's
attempts to mislead the Court by asserting facts which are either completely false or not
represented in the record below, is Allstate's repeated assertion that the Defendant has
refused to arbitrate this matter. This statement is completely false and also is not present
in any record below. Two of the Appellant's arguments are based on this misinterpretation
12

of the facts. The fact of the matter is that Vanliner Insurance Company and Frontier
Adjusters are, and always have been, willing to arbitrate, but have never been asked to do
so by Allstate. Since this fact is not in the record below and is the basis of two of the
Appellant's arguments, these arguments should be summarily disregarded by the Court of
Appeals.
It is unclear what remedy the Appellant is seeking. Allstate has not indicated that
jt would be willing to arbitrate this matter and Plaintiff has, in fact, chosen to appeal the
lower court's determination rather than enter into arbitration with Vanliner Insurance Co..
Mr. Thomas argues that somehow Vanliner may, in the future, refuse to arbitrate. The
statute is quite clear in stating that arbitration is mandatory. It appears that, should either
party refuse to arbitrate there is a remedy for violation of the statute. Mr. Thomas has also
made the argument that res judicata somehow applies here. Res judicata would only apply
to a suit for the same negligence claim between the same parties. Allstate has a remedy.
Allstate can file a subrogation action in the name of the insurers, pursuant to the statute
if arbitration is unsuccessful.
The ruling of the Circuit Court below was quite clear and simple. If Plaintiff was
attempting to file a subrogation claim pursuant to the statutes cited above, it should have
followed those statutes. While Section 31A-21-108 allows an insurer in a general insurance
action to bring an action in the name of its insured, the section does not apply to
subrogation claims for PIP reimbursement when there is a specific statute that does apply.
In fact, the specific statute for automobile, PIP insurance claims and/or subrogation claims
requires that "the insurer of a person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the
other insurer for the payment." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)(a) (1953), as amended.
The statute is quite clear. Plaintiff has failed to bring its subrogation action pursuant to
13

statute in the name of the proper parties. Therefore, the ruling of the Circuit Court below
was correct.
The Circuit Court below also ruled correctly that this action should be pursued in
binding arbitration. The statute on this is also quite clear. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22309(b) states that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be
decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. By not requesting or
initiating arbitration, Plaintiff has violated this statute. Plaintiff admits in his Brief that
Allstate has never initiated arbitration with the Defendant's insurer. The Defendant's
insurer has never refused to arbitrate and has always been ready, willing and able to do
so upon request. The Circuit Court's ruling requiring arbitration is clearly pursuant to the
statute and correct.
The Defendant, David P. Adams, (Appellee), for the above stated reasons
respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals uphold the Circuit Court's Ruling granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiffs Claim with Prejudice.
DATED this / / c l a y of July, 1990.
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN

JA
BARBARA ZtMMERMAN
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFEND ANT/APPELLEE
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DON E. OLSEN
KRIS C. LEONARD
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EXHIBIT A
DON E. OLSEN #24G
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Pla intiff
648 East First Sd uth
Salt Lake City, q tah 84102
Telephone (801) 63-2244
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT} LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
VERNON J. THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

]

COMPLAINT

vs ,
DAVID P. ADAMS,
Defendant.

Civil No.

Plaintiff complains of Defendant and for cause of action
alleges:
1*

That

at all times pertinent hereunto,, Defendant was a

resident of the State of Utah, and the amount in controversy is
less than $10,000.00.
2.

At all times pertinent hereunto, Defendant, as a

resident of the State of Utah, was operating a motor vehicle over
and upon the highways of the State of Utah within the terms of
Section 41-12a-SQ5, Utah Code Annotated, 1353 as amended, and
Plaintiff is infoUraed and reasonably believes that Defendant has
left the State of Utah and his last known address is as follows:
David P. Adams
19326 Fernwood Drive
Cfllppewa Falls, Wisconsin
3.

54729.

On or abqut December 14, 1987, on a public street known

as SR15, at or near 600 North structure, in Salt Lake City, Salt
Lake County, Utah, Defendant negligently and carelessly caused a

motor vehicle operated by her to collide with a vehicle owned by
Plaintiff.
4.

As direcjt and proximate result of Defendant's negligence

and carelessness aforesaid. Plaintiff suffered an heart attack
occasioned by strJess brought on from collision, and has incurred
reasonable and necessary medical expenses in the sum of
$3,000-00.
5.

Defendant has paid damage to Plaintiff's vehicle but has

failed and refused to pay Plaintiff's medical expenses*
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
Defendant for the sum of $3,000*00 together with interest at the
highest lawful rate from and after December 14, 1987, until date
of judgment hereia, for Plaintiff's costs of court and such other
relief as the Couat deems just.
DATED this

jfTt

ft

day of October, 1989.
MATHESON, MORTENSEN £ OLSEN

Don E* Olsen

2
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PETER STIRBA (3118)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
VERNON J. THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

:
: ANSWER
:

DAVID P. ADAMS,

: Civil No. 893010107CV
Judge Michael L. Hutchings

Defendant.
Defendant answers plaintiff's complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's complaint, and each and every claim or cause
of action asserted therein, fails to state a claim against
defendant upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant responds to the individual paragraphs of
plaintiff's complaint as follows:
1.

Defendant is without sufficient information or

tfelief as to the allegations of paragraph 1, and therefore
denies the same.
2.

Admits the allegations in paragraph 2.

3.

Denies the allegations of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.

THIRD DEFENSE
Any injury or damage sustained by plaintiff was solely
caused or proximately contributed to by his own actual fault or
by the actual fault of other persons who are not parties to this
lawsuit, which fault is equal to or greater in degree than any
actual conduct on the part of the defendant.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff's claim is barred by the execution of a
Release of All Claims dated August 9, 1989, a copy of which is
attached hereto.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered plaintiff's complaint,
defendant demands that the same be dismissed, with prejudice,
and that he be awarded his costs incurred herein, and such other
relief as this Court deems just and equitable.
DATED this

(cf*

day of November, 1989.
McKAY,/6ufcffON & ^HURMAN

By:

CERTIFICATE OF SERV^
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ANSWER was mailed, postage prepaid, this jQQ
day of
November, 1989, to the following:
Don E. Olsen, Escj.
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
For and in consideration of the payment to the undersigned
of the total sum of FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($5,000.00),
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned,
VERNON J. THOMAS and PHILIP C. STORY, JR., his attorney, hereby
forever release and discharge DAVID P. ADAMS, A&M MOVING AND "
STORAGE, INC., TRANSPROTECTION INSURANCE COMPANY and VANLINER
INSURANCE COMPANY, and any and all other persons, firms, or
corporations, from and of any and all claims, demands, benefits
either past or future, causes of action both for property damage,
damages, costs, loss of services, expenses or compensation on
account of or in any way growing out of an incident which occurred on or about December 14, 1987, on Interstate 15, at or
near Salt Lake City, Utah.
The undersigned hereby declare and represent that the
damages sustained by the undersigned are or may be permanent and
progressive and that recovery therefrom may be uncertain and
indefinite and in making this release and agreement, it is
understood and agreed that the undersigned rely wholly upon their
own judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent and
duration of said damages and in granting this complete release,
they do not rely upon anything told to them or represented to
them by the persons, firms or corporations who are being released, or by any person or persons representing them.
The undersigned further understand and agree that this
settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and
that payment is not to be construed as an admission of liability
on the part of any of the persons or companies referred to above
and who are released herein and by whom liability is expressly
denied.
The undersigned further acknowledge and accept the advice of
counsel in the settlement of this matter that this is a full,
complete and final release of the above-named parties for any
matter or thing done or omitted to be done by the said parties
and as a result of the incident referred to above. The undersigned further represent that there are no unresolved subrogation
claims and agree that if any such claims should be made, they
will indemnify and save harmless those parties released hereby.
The undersigned further states that they have carefully read
the foregoing Release of All Claims, know the contents thereof

and that they sign the same as their own free act, and it is
their intention to be legally bound thereby.
day of

DATED this

X-

9

1989

Vernon J

•Philip C. Story, Jr.
Attorney for Vernon J. Thomas

STATE OF UTAH
County of

S>oM U i ^

day of
1989, personally
On this c
appeared before (me VERNON J.' THOMAS, known to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowl1
edged that he executed
the same

w

DATED this _J

day of

1989.

Notary Public ri /
Residing at: _ _ _
My Commission Expires:

EXfflfBlTD
DON E. OLSEN #24 60
KRIS C. LEONARD #4 902
MATNESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
646 East EirfJt South
Salt Lake Oityr Utah 34102
Telephone: (301) 363-2244
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OR UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY. SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

VERNON .7. THOMAS,

)
)
)
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EXHIBIT
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VERNON J. THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
-vsDAVID P. ADAMS,

Civil No. 893010107CV
Judge Michael L. Hutchings

Defendant.
This matter was submitted to the Court for decision
based upon the memoranda of the parties and the pleadings on
file with the Court.

The Court, having reviewed Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment and the entire file in this matter,
and good cause appearing therefor,
HEREEY ORDERS that Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby granted and this case is dismissed with

preiudicXv 2 rtc&e^

l>TU^ & «• $Ato<\*ho-\» c(*t^ aMd^kot^d \^

DATED this ex 6^<fay of January, 1990.
BY THE COURT

Michael L. Hutchings
Circuit Court Judge

'\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
was mailed, postage prepaid, this

/2

day of January, 1990,

to the following:
Don E. Olsen, Esq.
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

•/ff.
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EXHIBffF
INTER-INSURER SUBROGATION MEMORANDUM
FILE IDENTIFICATION:

nATF

Your Claim No.:

13> I OOl

JOC1

Your Insured:

\tnr\rr}

Cfa <>;„*<,

Your Insured's Address: * l

//sii-fcc)

FcriTTOn

J'/g

Accident:

.

J/hAf.

/2 ,

n.,rr.ia>mNn.:
.

n,,r insured:

Dntxs

11?8
^iDO^QOUl

V&rn/nn

J-

Thomas

<S A I , s t a * e l n s u r a n c e C o .
U Allstate Indemnity Co.
Q Allstate County Mutual Ins. Co. [Texas only)
F R O M '

/U1i<><OUfi

r n u i V 1 ,

„

(Place)

(Date)

MARKET CLAIM OFFICE
5650 South 410 West
Salt Lake City UT 84123-0000

JQ.

niO°l S>.+tijhl*«d
SLC

UT"

^ 1024

L

ZLJ/21

REGARDING OUR SUBROGATION CLAIM AGAINST YOUR
I

I 1.
2.

ClyfrZ^Sj

Signature:.

7 ? Wz>G>&sfl_
</

J

L

COMPANY....

Repair or replacement of our insured's motor vehicle or other property is being made under the terms of our insured's
policy. Our subrogation claim is forthcoming. Please protect Allstate's interests.
Our Investigation reveals that your insured was at fault for the accident, and:

fXa.

Payment
tor repairs to our Insured's motor vehicle (or other property
Pc

^

pleted and documentation is attached. Please honor our claim:
pi
Allstate's interest: $ — [ S o l - ^
Insured's deductible (if indicated): $
IfY^ • —
TOTAL: s

//<,Q<1.

J\ have been com-

P i e a s e s e n d a separate

draft for
our insured's deductible
O YesjS^No

~

Db.

Our insured's vehicle was a total loss. Documentation is attached. Basis for our claim:
Amount paid to our insured:
$
——
PLUS initial towing and storage charges:
$.
TOTAL (1)
$.
Gross recovery on sale of salvage:
$
—
LESS fees in sale of salvage:
$
——
NET SALVAGE RECOVERY (2)
$Our subrogation interest (1 minus 2)
$.
PLUS our insured's deductible interest (if applicable):
S.
TOTAL SUBROGATION CLAIM:
$.

Dc

We possess rights of subrogation for Medical Expense Coverage payments. Documentation is attached. Please
honor our claim for:
^

Xld.

We possess rights of subrogation for No-Fault benefit payments. Documentation is attached. Please horor our
claim for:
\JcYr^ln
i/^v^^'S
Medical:
Work Loss:

s rtwy.Lr*:
$

J

Ess^Se/v^^ $ _ _ _

Surv. Loss:

$.

Funeral:

TOTAL:

$.

$___

I

I 3.

Following earlier correspondence to you regarding our subrogation claim, we incurred additional expense involving the
loss. Documentation is attached. Please include the following amount in our subrogation claim:
-

n

4.

Our assessment of liability factors warrants a subrogation demand of less than 100%. In lieu of the amount shown in 2a or
2b above, a
% a compromised request is indicated as toUows:

I

I 5.

n

6.

n
I I 7.
LZI 8.

D Allstate's interest only:

S

D Allstate's interest including our insured's deductible interest:

S

Documentation of our claim was sent to you earlier. Please remit payment.
An arbitration decision in our favor was rendered on

_. When may w | ^ x 0 6 c | ^ i ^ ^ n t j ? S

.

i—AS i\Ul

'f

i

A

n

Your offer of settlement is accepted. Please send your draft.
Your offer of settlement is unacceptable. We will proceed with legal action (or arbitration if applicable) unless our demand
is met within 20 days.

EXHIBITG
MCKAY, B U R T O N &

THURMAN

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
vviLFORD M B U R T O N
B A P R I E G. MCKAY
W I L L I A M T. T H U R H A N
DAVID P B R O W N
WILUAX THOMAS TXURMAN
P E T E R ST1RBA
DAVIO L BIRO
REID TATEOKA
S T E P H E N W RUPP
HARRY CASTON
B R Y A N A. L A R S O N
S C O T T C. P I E R C E
J O E L T. M A R K E R
B E N S O N L HATHAWAY. JR.
R. B R E T J E N K I N S

A T T O R N E Y S A N D C O U N S E L O R S AT LAW
SUITE 1200 KENNECOTT BUILDING
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE STREET

Of

COUNSEL

DAVID L MCKAY
TELEFAX 801-521-4252

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84133
(SOD 521-4135

A p r i l A, 1988

Allstate Insurance Company
Market Claim Office
5650 South 410 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123-0000
Attention:

Andra N. Hogan
Re:

Subrogation Claim/Vernon J,
Thomas

Dear Ms. Hogan:
I have reviewed Allstate's no fault subrogation claim with
the carrier for A S M Moving & Storage. Inasmuch as it is our
position that your insured's injuries did not arise out of the
accident, for which no fault benefits were provided, your claim
previously submitted to Frontier Adjusters is denied.
Very truly yours,

PETER STIRBA

/<P

PSl:kp
cc:
Libby L o v t h e r
Fave S c r o c h e r s

SUa/ \ i

S 4

•rH

IT

8

COPY

EXHIBITH

A p r i l 1 2 , 1988

• & '

C

c

Mr. Peter Stirba
McKay, Burton & Thurman
Suite 1200 Kennecott Bldg.
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
RE:

Our Claim Number
Our Insured
Accident Date
Your Client

1310092067 J30
Vernon J. Thomas
December 14, 1987
Frontier Adjusting fo:
A&M Moving & Storage

Dear Mr* Stirba:
Thank vou for vour corresoondence OJ

1988.

While I can appreciate your concerns regarding the relatedness of the heart surgery to the automobile accident, the
matter was carefully and fully investigated prior to any
payments being made.
Enclosed is another copy of Dr. Okawa1s January 12, 1988
medical report when he states "I feel definitely that the
accident did precipitate his (Vernon J. Thomas) myocardial
infarction, aggravating a pre-existing condition44.
I had
a long conversation with Dr. Okawa during which he strongly
reiterated his assessment that had the accident not occurred, Mr. Thomas would have remained asymptomatic and treatment for his coronary artery disease would not have been
necessary.
Dr. Okawa firmly established the relationship between the
resialting treatment and the auto accident. Once the correlation was made, we had no option but to cover the reasonable and necessary expenses under Mr. Thomas1 personal injury
protection coveraae.

c_
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INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

31A-21-108

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C J . S . — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 281.
Key Numbers. — Insurance «=» 144(1).

31A-21-107. Contract rights under noncomplying policies,
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by this title, a policy is
enforceable against the insurer according to its terms, even if it exceeds the
authority of the insurer.
(2) Any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement issued after July 1,1986,
and which is otherwise valid, which contains any condition or provision not
in compliance with the requirements of this title, is not rendered invalid by
this title. However, those conditions and provisions shall be construed and
applied as if the policy, rider, or endorsement was in full compliance with
this title.
(3) Upon written request of the policyholder or an insured whose rights
under the policy are continuing and not transitory, an insurer shall reform
and reissue or amend by a clearly stated rider its written policy to comply
with the requirements of the law existing at the date of issuance of the
policy. Subject to this section and § 31A-21-102, a person seeking to reform
a written insurance agreement by complaint or petition to a judicial authority shall show by clear and convincing evidence the existence of facts
establishing the reformation.
History: C. 1953, 31A-2M07, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; L. 1986, ch. 204,
§ 140.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection
(2), substituted "title" for "code"; and in Sub-

section (3), deleted from the end of the first
sentence "or if proved by clear and convincing evidence, to comply with the prior agreem e n t of the parties" and added the present
last sentence.

31A-21-108. Subrogation actions.
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its
insured.
History: C. 1953, 31A-2M08, enacted by
L. 1986, ch. 204, § 141.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1986, ch. 204,
§ 299 makes the act effective on July 1,1986.

341

31A-22-309

INSURANCE CODE

History: C. 1953, 31A-22-308, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, divided the formerly undivided language in Subsection (1)
into present Subsections (1) and (2); redesignated former Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3); substituted "when injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle, regardless of
whether the accident occurs in this state, the
United States, its territories or possessions, or
Canada, except when the injury is a result of

T

XHIBIT J

the use or operation of the named insured's
own motor vehicle not actually insured under
the policy" for "and" in Subsection (1) and "under the circumstances described in Section (1),
except where the person is injured as a result
of the use or operation of his own motor vehicle
not insured under the policy; and" for "when
injured in an. accident in Utah involving any
motor vehicle" in Subsection (2); and, in Subsection (3), deleted "in Utah" after the first instance of "occurring" and inserted "occurring
in Utah" near the end of the subsection.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Limitation of policy covering driver.
Father of passenger, who was killed while
riding in an automobile driven by insured's son
but owned by another person, was not entitled

to personal injury protection (PIP) coverage
under a policy covering the driver. McCaffery
v. Grow, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. App.
1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — What constitutes "entering" or
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of in-

surance policy, or statute mandating insurance
coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149.

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection.
(1) No person who has direct benefit coverage under a policy which includes
personal injury protection may maintain a cause of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the
following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the injured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his
injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; or
132

CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES

31A-22-309

(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive,
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials,
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which
may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307
are reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty
in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is
received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is
later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days
after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of 1-1/2% per
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160;
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 (2nd S.S.)
amendment, effective September 5, 1988,

added Subsections (2)(a)(iv) to (vi) and made
related stylistic changes, and substituted "is
subject to the following" for "shall provide" in
the introductory language of Subsection (6).
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NOTES TO PECISIONS
valid as to the entire policy limits. Farmers
Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985).
Household or family exclusions are valid in
this state as to insurance provided by an automobile policy in excess of the statutorily mandated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042
(Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

Household exclusion clause.
Personal injury protection requirements.
Household exclusion clause.
A household or family exclusion clause in an
automobile insurance policy is contrary to public policy and to the statutory requirements
found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the
minimum benefits provided by statute.
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah
1985).
Where the insurer fails to disclose material
exclusions in an automobile insurance policy
and the purchaser is not informed of them in
writing, those exclusions are invalid. Without
disclosure, the household exclusion clause fails
to honor the reasonable expectations of the
purchaser, rendering the exclusion clause in-

Personal injury protection requirements.
In order to invoke the provisions of Subsection (6), the individual who initially pays the
amounts for which personal injury protection
benefits are also available must be "another
insurer." McCaffery v. Grow, 128 Utah Adv.
Rep. 36 (Ct. App. 1990).
Subsection (6) does not contemplate arbitration between an iiininsured victim's father and
another's insurance company. McCaffery v.
Grow, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or statute mandating insurance coverage,
59 A.L.R.4th 149.
Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating coverage when insured obtains another policy providing similar coverage, 61
A.L.R.4th 1130.

Utah Law Review. — Note, The Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress: A New Cause
of Action in Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 571.
A.L.R. — Injury or death caused by assault
as within coverage of no-fault motor vehicle
insurance, 44 A.L.R.4th 1010.
Who is "employed or engaged in the automobile business" within exclusionary clause of liability policy, 55 A.L.R.4th 261.
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting

31A-22-310. Assigned risk plan.
(1) After consultation with insurers authorized to issue policies containing
the provisions specified under Section 31A-22-302, the insurance commissioner shall approve a reasonable plan for the equitable apportionment among
the insurers of applicants for those policies who are in good faith entitled to,
but are unable to procure, these policies through ordinary methods.
(2) Upon the commissioner's approval of a plan under this section, all insurers issuing policies described under Section 31A-22-302 shall subscribe to
and participate in the commissioner's approved plan.
(3) Any applicant for a policy under the commissioner's plan, any person
insured under the plan, and any insurer affected by the commissioner's plan
may appeal to the insurance commissioner from any ruling or decision of the
manager or committee designated to operate the plan.
(4) Section 31A-2-306 applies to the commissioner's decision on this appeal.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-310, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 161, § 82.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective January 1, 1988, designated

the previously undesignated provisions of this
section and, in Subsection (3), deleted "under
Subsection 31A-2-30K3)" following ''insurance
commissioner."
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